The Light of Judaism

But let's take a step back for a minute for you have once again omitted crucial details, mistranslated and distorted information to further your modern day Karaite theories.
Karaite theories?  You are labeling my theories out of context.  Karaism rejects any and all manifestations of Torah Shebaal Peh while I am working in the context of Torah Shebaal Peh just not from the degenerate perception that post-Talmudic scholars are infallible.  Your labeling of "Karaite" to this discourse is not applicable and you have done so in an attempt to discredit the information I present by resorting to name-calling or you have labeled this ideology as such because you are uneducated about the history and beliefs of the Karaim.  Either way this was an anti-intellectual statement.

The source for the study of maternal lineage does not start with the Talmud. It starts with the Mishna. For all those who may not know , the Mishna is the first writing of the oral law received from Sinai. This was the direct transmission handed down in an unbroken chain from Sinai. If you had started your analysis with the intent of objective discovery you would have started there and answered many of your own stumbling blocks.
We can discuss the Mishna as well, I have no problem with this.  However, your ideas about the Mishnah being an unbroken tradition from Sinai needs to be clarified.  The Oral Torah was not given on Sinai as we have it in the Mishna, Gemara, Talmud, etc.  The Oral Law at Sinai was not even a Law at all merely the authority of Moses passed to the Judges to interpret and establish an evolving body of legislation and judiciary procedures which was intended to meet the needs of each generation in its own particular environment.  This is why the Oral Law could not be written down- because it was fluid and adaptable.  Once the Oral Law was written down it ceased to be a fluid and living tradition and instead become a canonized second Bible, which violates the very spirit of Torah Shebaal Peh as it subsequently became a stagnant and impermeable rock which can't be moved. 
To clarify even further we can relate Torah to the Western Judiciary process we experience here in the US (albeit in a limited fashion).  The Torah of Moses represents a compilation of teachings regarding the specifics of laws of agriculture, the priesthood, dietary rules, sexuality, lending and usury, environmentalism, etc.  The Written Torah leaves the application of the bulk of these laws undefined.  The power of the legislation of logistics was handed to the Judges who made rulings based on the Torah, which was like a constitution for Jewish society, according to the needs of the people within their specific parameters.  This power of legislation grew as new cases emerged and problems needed to be resolved.  New laws, amendment, revisions, etc. were developed over many generations and these became a living body of oral teachings that could be adaptable to a variety of circumstances.  This is similar to the development of Law based upon a Constitutional principle here in the US.  We have a primary document of Constitution but as a Republic (Country ruled by Laws) we have an entire body of legislation relating to every facet of American experience.  This is a parallel concept in Judaism.  Unfortunately, the galut (exile) changed the entire dynamic of Jewish Law from a living oral legislative process to a written down codified Law that is wholly non-applicable to a wandering band of people not formally acting as a Society and outside of the Land of Israel.  In this sense, the new dynamic of Jewish experience is radically different from prior to the time of our last galut.

The Mishnah like other subsequent codes of Law was an attempt to distill the various diverse streams of Jewish thought and legislature into a written format that could be used during the galut.  Its writing was forbidden but Judah HaNasi carried out its compilation and editing anyway because of fears that the dispersed communities may forget the Rabbinical teaching that framed the overall Jewish experience between the years of 70 C.E. to 200 C.E.  This period of time covers nearly two centuries of halachic development after the destruction of Herod's Temple.  It set a standard for later Halachic Codes: i.e. Mishneh Torah & Shulchan Aruch, each of which was an attempt to distill Jewish Law into a universal Jewish canon of Halacha based on the perceptions and interpretations of its author.  None of these halachic texts have been universally accepted though and even the general texts are rejected in their specifics by every community.
The Mishna is simply saying that in a valid marriage the lineage of the child is patrilineal and this applies whether the marriage is between a Cohen, Levite or Israelite.  That is very straightforward and in line with what I have been asserting thus far.  Our Tradition has set the precedent, based upon the Torah, that within all valid marriages, the lineage goes through the father and this is also the case where a marriage was previously forbidden but later ruled lawful.    The second area of ambiguity rests in the case of a marriage where "sin" violates the lawful status of the marriage. The reason for the ruling: that the child is like the mother, was to save a child from the stigma of being a mamzer and the idea was that a child who was considered a gentile could then convert back into Judaism and not be tainted as a mamzer.  It was a clever way of overcoming the laws of mamzerim. This original Mishnaic intent was to keep patrilineal Jews in the Jewish fold not to isolate them.  This has been recognized by Rabbonim such as Rav Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer and Rav Ben Zion Uzziel who state that patrilineal descendants are classified as "zera Israel," that they are still of Jewish stock and they necessitate a conversion to actualize their true standing as Israel, which is unlike regular gentiles who don't have to be encouraged to convert since they are not zera Israel.  The Mishnaic ruling lead to serious debate and controversy as many Rabbis refused to recognize this ruling as it shifted a patrilineal system over to a matrilineal system in opposition to the teachings of Moses.  Subsequently we see one of these controversy's explode when R. Judah in the name of R. Assi rules that the marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew was to be considered valid based on the idea that the non-Jew was likely descended from the lost tribes of Israel (Yeb. 16b). 

The truth is that the Mishnah only made this ruling to spare children of the stigma of being a mamzer.  The ruling was made out of mercy but today it has been taken out of its intended context as a weapon against legitimate patrilineal Jews in order to exclude them from their rightful inheritance in Israel. 
You're really confusing apples with oranges here.  You're saying that tribal affiliation is determined by the father and that the mother determines Jewishness.  But you neglect a fundamental precept- Jews are Israelites but not all Israelites were Jews.  There was no necessity to render a child Jewish matrilineal rather the fathers house was all that was necessary to determine the child's affiliation within the "House" of Israel.  If a child was of the Tribe of Judah then they were a Jew by derivation.  In the days of 12 Tribe Israel there were many non-Jews in Israel as the other 11 tribes were not considered Jewish since they were not of Judah.  This is another context that is completely ignored by many today and it is a convenience of neglect since this fundamental idea teaches that the tribal affiliation determines ones standing in Israel thus matrilineal decent is irrelevant in the Torah narrative.  There were children in Israel who did not have a "house" or tribal affiliation as they joined the Israelites from amongst the nations thus they had no tribal inheritance.  This is why the Beit HaMikdash included a 13^th gate whereby the Israelites who did not have a tribal inheritance in Israel or didn't know their tribal affiliation could still enter into the Temple and worship.  The point being, the Torah doesn't exclude Hebrews on account of any form of lineage but does show preference in societal matters to patrilineal descent.  The census, whether it be for war or taxation, represents an "Israelite" status wherein males over a certain age were qualified to be a part of Israelite society.  Women and adolescents were not given this same level of participation.  This is not exclusionary of their status in Israel but we are dealing with a patriarchal society.  In conclusion, this does tell you how identity is conferred as the lineage of the father determined if one was Jewish- of the Tribe of Judah, regardless if the mother was from another Tribe (Naphtali, Issachar, Dan, Zevulon, etc.) or whether she was taken from the other nations (goyim).

The Mishna clears up the matter very clearly. Tribal affiliation comes from the father and Jewish identity only from the mother. The next matters are items 2 and 3. It's very important because if you don't start with those you can't even begin to analyze the Talmudic section. There are two aspects here, marriage in the eyes of the Torah and then lineage. The Mishna is teaching us something very important, before we can delve into the question of lineage, we first must see if marriage even applies. The Mishna goes on to teach us that Marriage does not apply between a Jewish male and a gentile female or between a gentile male and Jewish female. Then once we know this, we can apply the rule that when marriage does not exist, the lineage is after the female.
The Mishna is clear but in context it was a temporary solution to an immediate problem that was subsequently revised by the Talmud.  Can we embrace a revision of this sort?  We can unquestionably embrace a revision when it comes to matters of d'oratia vs. d'rabannan, in fact, I feel we are obligated to do so.  The Mishnaic ruling was made only in an exceptional circumstance (bedi-avad) and this is reflected in the context of the saying of Resh Lakish: "There are times when the suspension of the Torah may be its foundation" (Menahoth 99a-b).  Does this suspension still apply in current context?  Rabbi Nathan Cardoza speaks of these matters concerning the temporary suspension of the Torah and the sometimes terrible consequences when these temporary suspensions are never repealed and become long-standing Law:

"These concepts usually refer to short-term deferments, and are generally limited in scope. However, there have been cases in Jewish religious history where matters have been changed on a long-term basis, and in some instances were never revoked. In fact, these principles have even been used for totally opposing religious needs depending on the hashkafot of communities who were at wit's end how to enable Judaism to survive in modern times. Such examples can be found in Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch's concept of "Torah im Derekh Eretz"; the Hatam Sofer's opposition to general culture; the Hafetz Hayim's permissive ruling about intensive Torah education for young women; and the rabbinic prohibition in certain circles, concerning women's prayer groups. All of these were a response to an acute crisis, whether le-kulah or le-humrah, permissively or restrictively. They probably can't be included in the strict definition and parameters of hora'ath sha'ah, but they clearly carry its character and were accepted as such by different communities. They are all "hora'ath sha'ah-like."

Now the 24,000 question. How does the Mishna know these facts? The Mishna does not tell us, because the Mishna was about recording the oral law as it was handed down in the unbroken chain from Sinai. The Talmud then goes on to work to understand what the sources in the Torah for the Mishna's law is. The key is the Talmud is not here to validate the Mishna , it needs no validation or proof. It is coming to help us understand and where something is ambiguous to clarify. There is no ambiguity in the actual laws of this case. In truth this is where the conversation ends.

The conversation is long from over.  You never did respond to the information I gave by the historical scholars who delve into how the decision to elevate matrilineal lineage was influenced within its historical context.  Shaye Cohen states that it was Roman law that influenced the matrilineal principle. He points out that the language of Kiddushin 3:12 echoes Roman legal terminology almost exactly word for word, and that if rabbinic law has an external source then this is the only real possibility. Roman Law stated: The child is the legal heir of the father only if the father and mother are joined in a legal marriage (iustum matrimonium). The capacity to contract a legal marriage (conubium) was possessed almost exclusively by Roman citizens. Marriage between a person with conubium and one without was valid but it was not an iustum matrimonium and without that the child followed the status of the mother. At sometime during the 1st century BCE the Lex Minicia was passed, which declared that a child of such a union follows the person of the lower status. The Mishnaic ruling in and of itself is worded exactly as Roman Law so much so that the Mishna itself is guilty of plagiarism.  Why would the Rabbi's emulate Roman Law?  The Rabbi's themselves were Roman citizens and were influenced by Roman culture and education.  American Jews today are influenced by American ideals of governance and social norms and this is likewise reflected in American Judaism's manifestation.  No matter where Jews have been in the galut (exile) they have adopted customs and modified laws in accordance to their neighbors and there are many examples of this.

Since once someone rises up and declares that a clear, undisputed, unambiguous ruling in the Mishna and Shulchan Aruch is not correct using omissions and mistranslations as his "proof" then he is denying the oral law and playing with peoples minds. Once you deny the oral law, you can create whatever fantasy out of Judaism you desire. But I feel I should clarify some further misstatements and confused information.

So in your mind you believe it is not permissible to question the Codes of Jewish Law?  This is a most bizarre attitude that reflects more of a confined cultic mentality than the true Jewish spirit of questioning, challenging, debate and reformulation of halachic sources.  I am no more involved in heresy that the Maharal of Prage, one of the greatest Kabbalists, as well as the Maharshal and also Rabbi Haim Ben Betzalel all of whom were vehemently opposed to both the Shulchan Aruch and Rambam's Mishneh Torah.  They called them anti-Talmudic and anti-halachic.  Rabbi Nathan Cardoza writes of this as follows:

"Three early authorities were deeply concerned about this development: Rabbi Shelomo Luria, known as Maharshal (1510-1573); Rabbi Yehudah Low ben Betzalel, known as the Maharal of Prague (1520-1609); and Rabbi Haim Ben Betzalel (1530-1588), brother of the Maharal. Each in his own way attacked the Mishneh Torah and the Shulhan Arukh, claiming they were anti-Talmudic and therefore anti-halakhic. Maharshal accused Maimonides of acting "as if (he) received it (the Mishneh Torah) directly from Moshe at Mount Sinai who received it directly from Heaven, offering no proof ..." (Yam shel Shelomo, Introduction to Bava Kama). Directing his attack to Rabbi Joseph Karo's Shulhan Arukh in which the author follows the majority opinion of three authorities (Rif, Rosh and Maimonides), Maharshal asked how the author had the right to do so. Did Rabbi Joseph Karo receive such a tradition going back to the days of the sages? (ibid)
Maharshal goes on to state that the Shulhan Arukh's entire enterprise is dangerous. Those who study it will come to believe that what Rabbi Joseph Karo wrote has finality, and even "if a living person would stand in front of them and exclaim that the halakha is different, citing excellent arguments or even an authoritative received tradition, they will pay no heed to his words..." (Yam shel Shelomo, introduction to Hulin). Rabbi Haim ben Betzalel adds that people will fail to realize that this current authority is "just one person among many". (Vikuah Mayim Haim 7.)
Moreover, such codices lead to intellectual laziness. People will no longer study the Talmud in their reliance on these works. They can be compared to a pauper who collects alms from wealthy people and shows off his riches. At first it seems that he is indeed rich. After all, he has food and clothing. But in truth this is illusory, for all he has are the items he collected. (ibid) Similarly, one who studies only these codices and rules does not know the ins and the outs of the Talmudic debates which preceded them.
Rabbi Betzalel warns of yet another danger. How can one ever know whether the law as stated in the Mishneh Torah or Shulhan Arukh is applicable to a particular situation? Such matters are in a state of flux. A minor change may require a radically different response. Even more daring is his observation that since the "[Torah] is no longer in Heaven" (Baba Metzia, 59a-b) and halakhic matters must be decided upon by human beings, it is possible that the same halakhic authority may see things differently today than he did yesterday. As such, he may rule differently today than he did yesterday. This is not a shortcoming or inconsistency. It is all part of the principle that "these and those are the words of the living God."
Maharal adds that the Rabbi can only rely on his own intellect: "And even when his wisdom leads him to err, he is nonetheless beloved by God as long as he has used his best reasoning. And this person is by far preferred to the person who determines the halakha from within one work, without knowing the reason, walking like a blind person along the way" ( Netivoth Olam 16, end ).
These authorities agree that the Talmud alone should be the source of halakhic decision making. All declare that the concern "that there will be many Torahs in Israel" (Sanhedrin 88b) has no bearing on this matter. It is not the multitude of halakhic opinions which creates the danger of many Torahs; it is the rejection of the Talmud as the only authoritative text to decide on halakhic issues which presents this danger. In fact, it is codification which causes the problem of many Torahs in Israel, since it no longer requires the posek to return to the various opinions stated in the Talmud! The Talmud embodies Judaism in its most authentic form. It is the validity of each of the opposing opinions as part God's Torah which makes Judaism vibrant and true to its own spirit. It is only from the Talmud itself that the Rabbi needs to decide the law, taking into account all the different opinions mentioned therein."

The idea that the Shulchan Aruch is the standard whereby all halachic opinions must be tested has never been established as it is also opposed by the Yemenite Jews and the Talmidei Ha-Rambam communities as well as many leading poskin for the last sevral hundred years.  So who is being misleading here?

Let's go and see what the Talmud does with this Mishna. The Talmud looks for the source of the Mishna's statement that marriage does not apply to a gentile and then after it will look for the source that the child of a gentile woman is not Jewish. If one learns the Talmud properly it comes out that there are actually two sources that the Kiddishun does not apply to a gentile and two sources that the child of a gentile woman is always a gentile. For Ravina , it is like the author of the Zohar , as the Rashbi states , we learn that Kiddishun does not apply from the posuk – Devarim 7:3 – you should not intermarry…. This is taken as a definite PROHIBITION, which negates the marriage from being considered a marriage in the eyes of the Torah.

You are still ignoring the historical context of these statements.  The Torah and subsequently the Talmud are looking at marriage from an entirely different point of view from your modern exilic mentality.  As I have explained previously in my note, Jewish Identity: Part 2, the ancient Israelite custom was to take a woman and after the kiddushin she would live with her father-in-laws household and become a part of her husband's family, adopting her husband's family's religion and social norms.  In this context there is no question that the children would be Jewish or Israelite since this was the societal norm for kiddushin and in the context of the Mishna within this ideal arrangement the children born in this context follow the lineage of the father.  There is no disputing this.

The dispute comes into play when we have a marriage outside of this context.  Was the woman taken in marriage prohibited to the man who took her?  What if the woman is not taken as the man's wife but she has his child out of wedlock?  In these scenarios the child is considered a mamzer (bastard) and according to Jewish Law this child is severely restricted in Jewish society.  So much so that he/she can't marry freely or have the same religious rights as others.  So debilitating is the status of a mamzer that the Rabbi's determined that it is better to make a suspension of the Torah's law in Mishnaic times (likely because during that time these problems were prevalent under Roman rule) and thereby ruling a child is not Jewish could then be converted and retain full status as a Jew without the debilitating status as a mamzer.

Deuteronomy 7:3 has nothing to do with Jewish lineage.  This is a specific prohibition concerning a specific context of not inter-marrying the Canaanites as their idolatry would pollute Israelite monotheism and this did in fact happen many times throughout the narrative of the Hebrew Bible.  This one verse cannot logically be applied to all gentile nations as the context mandates that Israel wipe out these Canaanites and erase their memory from existence.  Logically, if we were to apply this verse to our context then you would be forced to conclude that the Jewish people are obligated to destroy all gentile populations.  Of course, this is absurd and has never been a Jewish position.

How do we know that the child is not Jewish from a gentile woman? This is from Devarim 3:4 "because he will lead your son astray…". There are two ways this is understood – both "he" and "son". Either the `he" is referring to the father in law from the 7 nations and it's a case of Jewish male/7 nation female or the "he" is referring to the husband from the 7 nations and it's a case of Jewish female/7 nation male. If it's the father in law, then it is understood that the Torah is not worried about the son's son for he is not Jewish – and the "son" is the Jewish husband. If the "he" is the 7 nation husband then it is understood that the Torah is worried about the child (the referred to "son") of the Jewish woman married to the man from the 7 nations but not with the child of a Jewish male married to a female of the 7 nations since he is not Jewish.

I have already explained this contextually in my note, Jewish Identity: Part 2, wherein I pointed out the historical context and explained this Talmudic statement by pointing out that there is no concern over a non-Israelite woman turning "your son" away not because the child is not Jewish but because the child is unquestionably Jewish.  Further, we need to look at the verse in question (Deut. 3:4) and consider that it also states: "your daughter you will not give to his son…" which would nullify any matrilineal principle.  Further, remember that the Mishnaic states clearly that in a proper marriage the child's lineage follws its father, therefore, we are here only referencing invalid marriages or circumstances where there is no marriage at all.  In historical context, these marriages would not have been accepted in Israelite society and the woman who was a gentile would have had a child of the same status if the Israelite father did not marry her and sent her home.  In this case she would return to the 7 nations wherein her and the child would not be a part of Israel.

There are also two ways we understand the word "astray". Either in the basic sense that it leads one to worship idols, or that it leads one to have no Jewish offspring. No Jewish offspring meaning is applied the case where the "son" is the Jewish Husband, worshiping idols in the case of the Jewish wife. This is also related to how the law is sourced beyond the 7 nations.

The basic sense of leading one into idolatry is the only sense implied.  You are fabricating an argument that is once again non-contextual.  In no contextual manner can the term "astray" be applied to the identity of children within the context of this narrative.  The term "astray" is a simple adjective, which describes the son as serving idols.

The Talmud then goes on to teach us something very important. The rest of the Rabbis learn the prohibition to marrying a gentile and the lineage of a gentile not being Jewish from a completely different set of psukim Devarim 21:13 and Devarim 21:15. (They do this because of their difficulty in using the first verses (Devarim 7:3) to apply to all nations.)

The Torah passages in question are not referencing Jewish lineage nor are they discussing the prohibition to marry women from other nations.  In fact, Deut. 21:13 negates your entire argument as it is discussing the "laws" of how you do take a wife from other nations and subsequently how you are to treat them, marry them and if needed to divorce them.  Deut. 21:15 is discussing the laws related to inheritance in a case of polygamy and has nothing to do with your assertions.  You have once again misquoted sources- the very thing you have accused me of.

 This illustrates extremely clearly that the Talmud is only "struggling" to ascertain the source of the Mishna's law and it offers two viewpoints. But the law is itself is never in question, not should it be for anyone who wants to pursue objective Truth as it has been taught from Sinai.
The Talmud is actually revising the laws of mamzerim and this judicial process happens throughout the Talmud.  As far as the origin of the Mishna's original prohibition, I have been very clear on demonstrating the Rabbi's dilemma within their cultural context that lead them to temporarily suspend the Torah's laws in dealing with mamzerim.  They framed their revision in the context of Roman Law and within our modern society there is not a need to maintain this Rabbinical Law as binding upon modern Jewish socieities.  We have every halachic right, albeit a mandate, to repeal this ancient ruling and restore the Torah's original ideal.